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Intragenerational Redistribution 
in Unfunded Pension Systems
LUIS CUBEDDU*
This paper studies the intracohort redistributive aspects of the United States
social security system in the context of a computable general equilibrium model.
It determines how the well-being of individuals who differ by gender, race, and
education is affected by government social security policy. Differences in life
expectancy and labor productivity translate into differences in capital accumula-
tion and labor supply distortions that are responsible for the observed welfare
difference between individuals of the same age cohort. [JEL: E62, H55, H61, J1]
A
major question facing policymakers in most western economies is how
best to guarantee a minimum level of support to their growing elderly
population. Adverse demographic prospects and recent slowdowns in economic
growth have prompted the reevaluation of the viability of public pension
programs and the distribution of their financing burden across generations. In
addition, as unfunded pension schemes approach maturity, the issue of how this
burden is distributed across individuals of the same age cohort has received
increased attention. Models that quantitatively explore the implications of
government social security policy, however, have almost exclusively focused 
on issues of intergenerational redistribution, disregarding altogether the intra-
generational transfers that arise from large differences in life expectancy and
labor productivity between individuals.
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and comments on a previous draft.This paper aims to quantify the extent of intragenerational redistribution in the
U.S. social security system.1 In particular, it determines how social security policy
affects the well-being of individuals who differ by gender, race, and education. For
this purpose, a general equilibrium–overlapping generations economy is developed,
where individuals face uncertain lifetimes. Within the same age cohort individuals
with different life expectancy and labor productivity coexist. Individuals decide
how much to work and how much to save in private assets for old-age consump-
tion. Retirement is mandatory and individuals are not altruistic. The return to
private saving and wages is determined by profit maximizing firms with standard
neoclassical production technology. The government is responsible for adminis-
tering the social security program. The program is pay-as-you-go and balanced
budget, and incorporates many features of the U.S. old-age insurance program.
Related literature includes Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who in an overlap-
ping generations–general equilibrium simulation model study the short-run and
long-run implications of changes in social security policy. Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995) extend their model by assuming credit and insur-
ance market imperfections and find that unfunded pension schemes may in certain
cases enhance the steady-state welfare of a dynamically efficient economy. Both
works disregard ex ante differences in mortality risk and labor productivity
between individuals belonging to the same age cohort, and therefore are unable to
quantify the extent of intragenerational redistribution inherent in unfunded
pension schemes.2 The paper is closer in spirit to that of Fullerton and Rogers
(1993), who quantify the distribution of the burden of the U.S. tax system across
12 different lifetime income groups. Instead, in this paper individuals are catego-
rized into eight different lifetime groups that differ in terms of their labor produc-
tivity and life expectancy. By focusing solely on the U.S. social security system,
the model is capable of addressing in more detail certain features of the system. 
In dynamically efficient economies, the return to unfunded pension schemes is
less than the return to private saving. By essentially forcing individuals to substitute
private assets for social security tax contributions, unfunded pension schemes in the
presence of perfect insurance markets are welfare reducing. The magnitude of the
loss increases with the expected present value of the difference between the future
income that could have been guaranteed by the displaced saving and the social
security benefits. Since unfunded pension schemes are designed not to discriminate
on the basis of an individual’s probability of dying early, the expected rate of return
to contributions increases with an individual’s life expectancy. In addition,
unfunded schemes with progressive tax-benefit links reward individuals with lower-
than-average lifetime earnings, at the expense of those with higher-than-average
lifetime earnings. The higher the return to social security, the lower the observed
welfare loss. However, differences in the expected return to an unfunded pension
scheme can explain only part of the observed intracohort variability in welfare.
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1In this paper, social security is treated purely as an old-age insurance program.  Survivor, disability,
and hospital insurance features are disregarded.
2In Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), since individuals cannot fully insure against unem-
ployment risk, individuals of the same age group may differ ex post not only in their labor income but also
in their asset holdings.Differences in workers’ productivity–age profiles are also responsible for
differences in capital accumulation and labor supply distortions.3 Assuming a
closed economy, the introduction of pay-as-you-go social security crowds out
capital formation, causing interest rates to rise and wages to fall. The change in
relative factor prices will encourage workers to increase labor supply and saving
early in life, so as to enjoy consumption and leisure later in life. Workers with later
productivity peaks will not only observe a greater drop in the present value of their
labor endowment, but will also find changes in their saving and labor supply
behavior more distortionary.
The benchmark economy, which attempts to approximate certain features of
the U.S. social security system, has an average replacement rate to labor earnings
of 40 percent, a legal retirement age of 65, and a progressive tax-benefit formula.
The paper simulates the steady-state effects of eliminating social security on
macroeconomic aggregates as well as the lifetime welfare of cohorts that differ in
their gender, race, and education. Results indicate that the steady-state welfare
gains from privatizing (eliminating) social security are lower for females, whites,
and noncollege graduates than for males, nonwhites, and college graduates. They
are on average 40 percent greater for males than females, 4 percent greater for
nonwhites than whites, and 9 percent greater for college graduates than noncollege
graduates. The results are robust regardless of whether private annuity markets are
assumed absent or present. Findings imply that the current system is lifetime
progressive across gender and education, yet lifetime regressive across race. The
latter result is very sensitive to the model’s calibration.
I. The Model
The economy is composed of individuals who live a maximum of I periods each
in overlapping generations. In each generation there are J individual types who
differ according to life expectancy and labor productivity. The probability of
surviving between age i and age i + 1 for a type j individual is sij. Therefore, the
unconditional probability of reaching age i for type j is
The share of age i, type j individuals is denoted by µ ij. All individual types grow
at the exogenous rate λ µ and population is to be stable in the sense that the cohort
shares for each individual type are time-invariant.4 This implies that the measure













3Social security is financed through a payroll tax that distorts an individual’s labor supply decision.
The magnitude of the distortion is a function of both the age-specific net marginal tax rate and the shape
of a worker’s wage–age profile. Since workers, in deciding how much to work, perceive no linkage at the
margin between social security benefits and taxes, marginal taxes will equal across types for all ages.
4A population’s steady-state growth rate is determined by its age-specific mortality and fertility rates
(assuming these remain constant over time). If different types of individuals have different survival prob-
abilities, as is the case in this paper, then for all types to grow at the same rate, fertility rates must differ.
Specifically, individuals with shorter life expectancy must have higher birth rates.(1)
Time subscripts are ignored, as the dynamic feature of the model is captured by
the age subscript. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time per period, which
must be allocated between work and leisure. One unit of time of an age i, type j
individual can be transformed into ε ij, exogenously given units of labor input.
Preferences
Preferences are given by the expected discounted utility of a time separable, twice
continuously differentiable, strictly concave, utility function of leisure and a
consumption good:
(2)
where β is the annual discount rate, cij is consumption, and lij is leisure for an indi-
vidual age i and type j. Every period, earnings are divided between consumption
and gross investment. Individuals accumulate assets to smooth consumption over
time. In the presence of private annuities individuals can insure against mortality
risk. Annuity markets are established to avoid the issue of what to do with the
assets of the deceased. Since the ex ante mortality probability of each individual
is public information, competitive insurers will offer annuities with different rates
of return to individuals with different life expectancies. Individuals of the same
age cohort and type sign a contract in which survivors share assets of the individ-
uals who die. In this manner, next period’s asset holdings are this period’s saving
divided by the probability of surviving. This implies that a type j individual faces
the following budget constraint:
(3)
where aij is the accumulated net wealth, yij is gross saving, bij are retirement
benefits, and a´i+1,jis next period’s accumulated wealth of an individual age i and
type j. The return on asset holdings is R; the spot price of one unit of labor input
in terms of the consumption good is W; and the social security payroll tax is τ .
Individuals retire at age IR, after which they rely on private saving and social
security benefits for their old-age consumption. Formally, ε ij = 0 for i ≥ IR, and
for all type j individuals. Finally, the model assumes that workers, in deciding
how much to work, perceive no linkage at the margin between social security
benefits and taxes.
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93Technology
Firms maximize profits, taking factor and output prices as given. Technology is
given by a neoclassical production function, f(K,N), where K is the aggregate capital
stock and N is the aggregate labor input. Capital depreciates at rate δ . Firms hire
physical capital and effective labor until gross factor prices equal marginal products: 
(4)
Government
The government levies a payroll tax on labor earnings to finance social security
pensions. The social security tax rate is the same for all those with labor earnings
up to a maximum level, E
max. The system is pay-as-you-go and the budget is
balanced each period, as revenues from payroll taxes equal outlays in the form of
social security pensions: 
(5)
Social security pension benefits correspond to a fixed proportion of an individual’s
lifetime average earnings. However, earnings of workers beyond the statutory
maximum are not considered when computing an individual’s average lifetime
earnings. Earnings are indexed to account for labor productivity growth, λ y. Wages
prior to retirement age, IR, are revalued so that they equal the wages of workers at
the time they turned age IR–1. Average lifetime indexed earnings for an age i, type
j individual is given by:
(6)
Social security achieves progressivity not through graduated tax rates, but
rather through the structure of benefits. The function relating retirement benefits
and average lifetime earnings is highly redistributive, providing a much higher
ratio of benefits to preretirement income to retirees with lower earnings history.
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94where η (mij) is the average earnings replacement rate for an age i, type j individual
with average lifetime indexed earnings, mij. The government announces an average
replacement rate η avg, and a benefit formula, and then sets taxes such that the budget
is balanced each period. Individuals in the economy are atomistic in that they disre-
gard the effect their labor supply decisions may have on the social security payroll tax.
Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium corresponds to a feasible allocation and a set of factor
prices, such that the individual’s problem is solved for each generation, firms
maximize profits, the government balances its budget, and markets clear. Market-
clearing conditions for capital and labor markets are given by: 
(8)
while the goods market clearing condition is: 
(9)
II. Model Parameterization and Calibration
The model’s parameters are described in the following paragraphs.
Demographics
Individuals are born into adulthood at age 20 and can live up to age 85, after which
death is certain. The population is composed of eight different lifetime cohorts that
differ in gender, race, and education. There are two gender types: male and female;
two race types: whites and nonwhites; and two education types: college and
noncollege educated. Lifetime cohorts differ in their life expectancy and labor
productivity profile. To ensure a stable population, the model assumes that
mortality rates remain constant over time and that all lifetime cohorts grow at the
same constant exogenous rate. As stated previously, the assumption implies that
types with shorter life expectancy must also have higher birth rates.5 To match the
model’s stationary demographic structure with some general features of the
current U.S. population, the proportion of individual types at age 20 equals that
found in the United States in 1988.6
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5This condition is empirically verified. The data show that females, whites, and the college educated
outlive males, nonwhites, and the noncollege educated, but that the latter group observes higher birth rates.
6Although the current U.S. demographic structure is far from being stationary, as the proportion of
nonwhites and college-educated people in the population has been increasing over time, the assumption
allows for the existence of a stable population where different lifetime cohorts coexist. The annual rate of population growth, λ µ , is assumed constant at 1.2
percent, which approximately corresponds to the average U.S. rate over the past
25 years. Age-specific survival probabilities across gender and race are taken
from the 1988 United States Vital Statistics Mortality Surveys, while mortality
differences across education groups come from a study conducted by Elo and
Preston (1996). This study indicates that more educated cohorts, through
greater access of material and informational resources such as diet, housing,
and health care service, live longer on average. Nevertheless, education can
only account for about 18 percent of the mortality difference between whites
and nonwhites. Figures 1 and 2 show survival probabilities for the different
cohorts.
Age, gender, and education specific labor productivity, ε , are compiled
using Current Population Survey (CPS) March demographic files for 1989–91.
The sample includes private sector employees, above the age of 19, not working
in the agriculture sector. Data for different years are adjusted using the GDP
deflator. For each age cohort and individual type the per year mean labor earn-
ings and mean hours worked are computed. Mean wages are computed by
simply dividing mean earnings by mean hours worked. Wages are then normal-
ized to the average wage in the economy in order to determine the endowment
of labor efficiency units. Wage–age profiles are presented in Table l and Figures
3 and 4. A polynomial of degree two in age is used to smooth the wage–age
profile. The data show that females and noncollege graduates reach their
productivity peak before males and college graduates, respectively; early wage
growth is considerably higher for college graduates than for noncollege gradu-
ates; and, for all ages, whites earn higher wages than nonwhites, even after
controlling for gender and education.
Table 2 describes the demographic and economic characteristics of the popu-
lation. The data show that females outlive males by an average of 5.1 years, yet
have on average wages that are 27.1 percent lower than those of males. Whites
live on average 3.6 more years and have wages that are 13.6 percent higher than
nonwhites. Similarly, college graduates outlive noncollege graduates by 0.8
years, and have wages that are on average 42.1 percent greater than wages of
noncollege graduates.
Since household composition changes significantly over the lifecycle 
due to marriage, divorce, death of spouse, and number of dependents, the
model characterizes the lifetime distributional consequences of social security
on single individuals rather than on households. This approach is standard 
in models that study the lifecycle implications of tax policy (see Fullerton and
Rogers, 1993). Therefore, men and women are treated as independent decision-




7Craig and Batina (1991) use a two-period, general equilibrium–overlapping generations model to
simulate the effect of spouse and retirement insurance on family labor supply. In their specification, they
are able to use households as welfare measuring units by assuming that the marital status of the couple
does not change over the lifecycle.INTRAGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION IN UNFUNDED PENSION SYSTEMS
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Figure 2. Unconditional Survival Probabilities: Noncollege Educated



















Figure 1. Unconditional Survival Probabilities: College Educated




















Table 1. Wage Index by Age, Sex, and Education
Current Population Survey: 1989–91
White Nonwhite
College Noncollege College Noncollege
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
20–24 0.936 0.860 0.670 0.599 0.901 0.878 0.615 0.566
25–29 1.272 1.118 0.898 0.718 1.146 1.020 0.798 0.639
30–34 1.548 1.277 1.047 0.764 1.389 1.171 0.863 0.696
35–39 1.769 1.297 1.149 0.803 1.656 1.315 0.970 0.751
40–44 1.895 1.279 1.250 0.831 1.683 1.359 1.021 0.788
45–49 1.984 1.178 1.297 0.813 1.782 1.294 1.010 0.769
50–54 2.044 1.129 1.263 0.778 1.544 1.111 0.949 0.664
55–59 2.084 1.137 1.233 0.757 1.542 1.013 0.953 0.641
60–64 1.975 1.066 1.194 0.734 1.184 1.040 0.941 0.568
65+ 1.643 0.902 0.906 0.643 1.631 1.094 0.665 0.493
Figure 3. Wage Efficiency Index: Whites
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Figure 4. Wage Efficiency Index: Nonwhites


















Table 2. Demographic and Economic Characteristics of Population
Life Average  Percent  of
Population Type Expectancy Productivity Population
Overall 73.70 1.000 100.00
Male White Noncollege 71.61 1.018 28.35
College 72.09 1.659 9.52
Nonwhite Noncollege 66.65 0.991 7.66
College 67.04 0.845 2.57
Female White Noncollege 76.87 0.725 30.37
College 77.47 1.157 10.20
Nonwhite Noncollege 73.37 0.671 8.46
College 73.90 1.159 2.87Preferences and Technology
The expected lifetime utility of a type j individual is given by: 
(10)
This functional form for preferences implies that leisure is independent of produc-
tivity, and has the advantage that the parameters needed for its calibration, β , θ ,
and γ , have been extensively studied in the literature. In addition, intertemporal
separability of utility implies that leisure and consumption at different dates are
net substitutes, and that the inverse of the degree of risk aversion equals the degree
of intertemporal substitution.
All lifetime cohorts are endowed with the same preferences. The discount
factor is normalized to account for productivity growth, λ y, such that
. The true discount factor, βˆ, equals 1.011, and is taken from the 
Hurd (1989) study of retired singles, where differences in mortality probabilities 
across gender and race are accounted for. Consistent with the Becker and Ghez
(1975) finding that households allocate approximately one-third of their discre-
tionary time to market activities, the consumption share parameter, θ,  is 0.33.
Given the stability of average hours worked since World War II, the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and leisure is taken to be 1. The risk aver-
sion parameter, γ , or inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 4.
The choice represents a compromise between different lifecycle models that
explicitly account for leisure, and is consistent with that used in Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987).8 Different values for β and γ are chosen as part of a sensitivity
analysis. 
Since factor shares of income have been fairly constant over time, the paper
assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, f(K,N)=Kα N1–α . The value of the
capital share parameter, α , depends on how the stock and flow of services from
government capital and consumer durables, proprietors’ income, and inventories
are treated. Since the model contains no household production sector, no govern-
ment investment, and no explicit treatment of inventories, consistent with Cooley
and Prescott (1995), the capital share parameter equals 0.36. The depreciation rate,
δ , is determined by the ratio of gross investment to capital, which according to
National Income Accounts is approximately 0.76. The annual rate of productivity
growth, λ y, is assumed constant at 1 percent, which approximately corresponds to
the average U.S. rate over the past 25 years. After accounting for population and
productivity growth, depreciation is 5.4 percent a year.
ββ λ
θ


























8For the preferences used in this paper, the lower the degree of risk aversion, the less individuals care
about consumption smoothing and the more willing they are to substitute labor from periods of low wages
to periods of high wages. In the presence of uncertainty, the lower the degree of risk aversion, the smaller
the fraction of resources devoted to precautionary savings.Social Security
Social security is treated purely as an old-age insurance program. Spouse,
survivor, disability, and health insurance features are disregarded. Social security
pension benefits are indexed to labor productivity growth; the benefit structure is
progressive and means tested. As dictated by current social security legislation,
wages are revalued so that they equal the wages of workers at the time they turned
60. Individuals retire and receive social security benefits starting at age 65.9
Monthly social security benefits, known as the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA),
are a function of the retired individual’s Average Index Monthly Earnings (AIME).10
Since the program achieves its progressivity through the structure of benefits and not
through graduated tax rates, benefits are structured so that the PIA increases with the
AIME at a decreasing rate. The function relating the PIA to the AIME has three
segments with sharply declining ratios of PIA to AIME. These values are calibrated
consistent with the legislation specified in the 1993 Social Security Handbook. The
first $401 of AIME entitled the retiree to a primary insurance of 90 cents per dollar of
AIME. The next segment covered AIME values up to $2,420, where each dollar of
AIME entitled the retiree to 32 cents of benefits. Above that level, each dollar of AIME
produced only 15 percent of primary insurance benefit up to some set maximum. The
average replacement rate to income in 1993 was approximately 45 percent and the
average personal income close to $1,920 per month. The replacement rate of an age i,
type j individual with average annual lifetime earnings, mij, can be summarized as: 
(11)
where η avg is the replacement rate for an individual with average labor earnings
corresponding to mavg. The fraction of primary insurance allowed per unit of
AIME, between earnings bend points mk
bend and mk+1
bend, is defined as πkη avg.11 Since
earnings above $4,800 per month are not counted in calculating a person’s AIME,
E max is set equal to 2.5 times the economy’s average pretax labor earnings.
Figure 5 relates the effective social security replacement rate to an individual's
average annual lifetime earnings.
III. Findings
The welfare implications of changes to the U.S. social security system, at both the
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9Legislation passed in 1983 calls for a gradual increase in the age at which future retirees are able to
receive full benefits. By 2022, the age will be 67.
10In computing an individual’s AIME, the model considers labor earnings for all ages prior to retire-
ment. Current legislation instead considers the highest 35 years of labor earnings.
11The fraction of PIA allowed per unit of AIME is calculated by multiplying the average replacement




bend= 1.25mavg; and m4
bend= 2.5mavg.Aggregate Welfare Implications
The benchmark economy is one where the average replacement rate to income is 40
percent, legal retirement age is 65, and the benefit formula is progressive. Since the
paper is intended to determine the extent of intragenerational redistribution inherent
in the U.S. social security system, the model refrains from transition analysis, and
focuses solely on the long-run implications of policies that divert from the bench-
mark.12 As is well-documented in the literature, increases in pay-as-you-go social
security will crowd out capital formation, which in turn will cause pretax wages to
fall, interest rates to rise, and ultimately output to fall. Policy aimed at reducing the
size of social security will bring about positive long-run macroeconomic effects. The
model predicts that eliminating social security will increase steady-state capital by
22.8 percent, aggregate output by 9.8 percent, aggregate consumption by 5.2 percent,
and aggregate labor by 3.1 percent. The increase in full lifetime resources required to
make all individual types indifferent between the benchmark economy and one where
social security is absent equals 2.52 percent of GDP and 2.57 percent of the
economy’s lifetime labor endowment.13 The macroeconomic effects of social secu-
rity policy in steady-state are found in Table 3.
Luis Cubeddu
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12Obviously, changes in social security for an initial transition period will affect the young and old
very differently. Appendix I describes the algorithm used in computing the model’s equilibrium.
13These results are similar to those found in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who show a replacement
rate of 60 percent reduces steady-state capital by 24 percent and that the welfare loss is about 6 percent
of full-time resources.
Figure 5. Effective Social Security Replacement Rate by Income














Source: Social Security Handbook, 1993.
Note: Labor earnings units are equivalent to US$100,000.Figures 6 through 9 show assets, net worth, consumption, and hours worked
profiles for an average white, male, noncollege graduate. As predicted by standard
lifecycle models, individuals smooth consumption over the lifecycle by borrowing
early, accumulating assets over the remainder of their working lives, and dissaving
after retirement. When a pay-as-you-go social security system is introduced, indi-
viduals save less on their own (though their net worth is roughly constant). In addi-
tion, an increase in the steady-state return to capital will encourage individuals to
increase work effort and save more early so to reduce work effort and consump-
tion at a later age. 
Intracohort Welfare Differences
Lifecycle savings and work effort vary with life expectancy and labor productivity.
Individuals with longer life expectancy save and work more during their active
period of life to finance a longer retirement. Workers with later productivity peaks
save less, since their age–earnings profile more closely matches their optimal
consumption plan. This section evaluates how changes in social security policy
affect the lifecycle behavior and lifetime utility of individuals who differ in their
life expectancy and labor productivity. 
Since pay-as-you-go social security does not discriminate on the basis of an
individual’s probability of dying early, the expected rate of return to contributions
increases with an individual’s life expectancy. In addition, the progressive nature
of the system benefits individuals with below average lifetime earnings. The gross
expected return to social security of a type j individual, Rss,j, is that which equates
the present value of expected lifetime contributions to the present value of
expected lifetime benefits: 
(12)
Table 4 shows how these returns compare across individuals, under different
scenarios of population growth, and social security tax policy. Results show that,
when controlling for gender, the progressivity of the social security system miti-
gates the redistribution involved in pooling risk, since income and life expectancy
are positively correlated. Nonwhite, male college graduates face the lowest
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Table 3. Social Security and Economic Aggregates
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Policy τ (%) K/Y K N C Y Ω/ PV LE Ω/ Y
Benchmark 9.40 3.400 1.916 0.283 0.418 0.564 0.00 0.00
η = 0% 0.00 3.803 2.354 0.292 0.440 0.619 2.57 2.52
Note: Benchmark policy: η = 40%, IR = 65, and progressive benefit formula.Luis Cubeddu
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Figure 6. Assets Age Profile and Social Security Policy
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Figure 8. Consumption Age Profile and Social Security Policy
Replacement rate = 0%
Replacement rate = 40%














Replacement rate = 0%
Replacement rate = 40%














Figure 9. Hours Worked Age Profile and Social Security Policy
Type: Male-White-Noncollegetax-benefit formula were in place instead, females, whites, and college graduates
would earn higher returns simply because they live longer on average.
Since social security essentially forces individuals to hold an annuity, in
dynamically efficient economies, a higher return to social security contributions
implies a smaller difference between the return to private saving and social secu-
rity. Therefore, asset accumulation distortions are less severe for those with above-
average life expectancy and below-average earnings.14
However, differences in the expected return to social security can help explain
only part of the variation in lifetime welfare across cohorts. Social security is
financed through a payroll tax that distorts an individual’s labor supply decision.
Since the paper assumes that individuals do not perceive a link between the social
security payroll tax and benefits at the margin, the marginal tax rate equals across
types for all ages.15 The variability in capital accumulation and labor supply
distortion is then due to differences in workers’age–productivity profiles. Workers
with later productivity peaks find increases in social security more distortionary
than workers with earlier peaks. Unfunded pension schemes crowd out capital
formation, cause interest rates to rise and wages to fall, and encourage workers to
increase labor effort and saving early in life, so as to enjoy consumption and
leisure later in life. Therefore, workers with later productivity peaks will find
changes in their capital accumulation and labor supply behavior more distor-
tionary. In addition, workers with later productivity peaks will observe a greater




14The welfare loss increases with the expected present value of the difference between the future
income guaranteed by the displaced saving and the social security benefits.
15If workers were to perceive a tax-benefit link, labor supply distortions would be mitigated. Workers with
higher life expectancy and lower lifetime earnings would observe lower net marginal taxes and in turn lower
labor supply distortions. In addition, since net marginal taxes fall with age, workers would be encouraged to
postpone their labor effort. Therefore, those with late productivity peaks will find changes in their labor supply
less distortionary. A more elaborate discussion of these issues is found in Feldstein and Samwick (1992), who
document social security net marginal tax rates across age, gender, marital status, and income class.
Table 4. Social Security Expected Rate of Return (percent)
Progressive Tax Flat Tax
Population Type λ µ = 1.2 λ µ = 2.0 λ µ = 1.2
Male White Noncollege 1.18 2.09 1.21
College 0.53 1.53 1.31
Nonwhite Noncollege 0.82 1.69 0.64
College 0.36 1.27 0.73
Female White Noncollege 2.18 2.98 1.87
College 1.87 2.67 1.92
Nonwhite Noncollege 1.91 2.70 1.49
College 1.55 2.36 1.59Tables 5 and 6 show that, in the long-run, all cohorts experience an increase
in their private saving, labor effort, and welfare when social security is eliminated.
Workers, besides increasing their labor effort, increase the productivity of their
work by postponing effort to later in the lifecycle. Results show that individuals
with higher returns to social security offset to a greater degree increases in manda-
tory contributions, by reducing their private saving. Therefore, eliminating pay-as-
you-go social security is likely to produce a greater increase in the private saving
of females, whites, and noncollege graduates, since these cohorts on average earn
a higher return to social security.
In addition, labor effort is found to be less responsive to changes in social secu-
rity policy the later a worker’s age–productivity peak. Since eliminating social secu-
rity implies eliminating the payroll tax and reducing the relative return to capital in
steady-state, individuals will not only increase their labor supply but also shift their
work effort to later in the lifecycle. The later a worker’s productivity peaks the less
labor supply must accommodate to achieve the desired consumption and leisure plan.
INTRAGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION IN UNFUNDED PENSION SYSTEMS
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Table 5. Intracohort Welfare and Social Security (Part A)
(percent change)
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours 
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
Male 22.22 1.66 2.45 3.21
Female 23.18 3.68 3.96 1.94
White 23.26 2.55 2.99 2.55
Nonwhite 20.83 2.94 3.31 2.65
College 20.32 2.42 2.93 2.76
Noncollege 23.93 2.71 3.12 2.51
Table 6. Intracohort Welfare and Social Security (Part B)
(percent change)
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours
Quality
Population Savings Hours Adjusted ω j
College 24.29 1.71 2.53 3.10
Male White Noncollege 20.18 0.88 2.03 3.55
College 20.52 2.26 2.88 3.15
Nonwhite Noncollege 16.19 1.93 2.73 3.37
College 24.53 3.58 3.88 1.89
Female White Noncollege 21.32 3.89 4.12 1.93
College 23.44 3.82 3.99 2.04
Nonwhite Noncollege 20.20 3.55 3.89 2.26Females, nonwhites, and noncollege graduates, who on average have earlier
age–productivity peaks, experience larger changes in their labor supply.
The extent of intracohort redistribution is quantified by comparing the steady-
state welfare gains of eliminating social security across lifetime cohorts.16 Social
security is defined as “lifetime progressive” when resources required to make
individuals indifferent between the benchmark economy with social security and
the alternative economy without social security increase with the present value of
their labor endowment in the benchmark economy. If eliminating social security
causes males to enjoy lifetime welfare gains, which relative to their expected
present value of lifetime wealth are greater than those of females, then social secu-
rity is said to benefit females at the expense of males. Similarly, if the welfare
gains relative to the expected present value of lifetime wealth of eliminating social
security were equal for all cohorts, then the system is defined as “lifetime propor-
tional” since it does not redistribute resources intragenerationally. 
Results indicate that welfare gains are greatest for cohorts whose private
saving and labor supply are less responsive to changes in the system. Cohorts that
have below average life expectancy, above average lifetime earnings, and later
productivity peaks stand to gain more from reductions in social security. The
results confirm that males, nonwhites, and college graduates experience a greater
welfare gain from privatizing (here understood as eliminating) social security than
females, whites, and noncollege graduates, respectively. These gains are, on
average, 39.8 percent greater for males than females, 3.8 percent greater for
nonwhites than whites, and 9.1 percent greater for college graduates than noncol-
lege graduates. The results imply that the current system is lifetime progressive
across gender and education, yet lifetime regressive across race.17 Appendix III
shows that these results are fairly robust to the choice of parameters values.
Results in the Absence of Annuities
Empirical evidence suggests the near absence of private formal or informal markets to
insure against uncertain longevity. In this section, the robustness of the model is tested
for when private annuity markets do not exist18. In the absence of private annuities, the
individual’s problem is slightly different. Individuals still accumulate assets for life-
cycle reasons, but now precautionary motives become relevant as uncertainty about an
individual’s life expectancy induces saving to cover consumption in the event he or she
lives longer than expected.19 In contrast to equation (3), gross saving is now given by:
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16Appendix II provides a detailed discussion on the measurement and comparison of steady-state welfare.
17One may also argue that social security makes the lifetime distribution of wealth more equal, by taking
larger amounts away from lifetime rich groups (male, college graduates) than from lifetime poor groups
(female, noncollege graduates).
18Studies show that only about 2 percent of the elderly own individual annuities. Not only do insurance
companies lack information about an insurer’s survival probabilities, but regulatory constraints may force
them to offer the same contract to males and females. See Warshawsky (1988) and Mitchell and others (1998)
for evidence on why individual annuity markets are thin.
19Precautionary saving in response to risk is associated with convexity of the marginal utility func-
tion or a positive third derivative. The model’s preferences guarantee a positive precautionary saving
motive. See Kimball (1990) for more on this issue.(13)
where φij represents the lump-sum transfer of accidental bequests for an age i, type
j individual. The government is now responsible for collecting and distributing the
accidental bequests. Unintended bequests are assumed to be taxed at 100 percent
and returned in a lump-sum fashion to survivors of all ages.
(14)
In the presence of uninsurable mortality risk individuals discount the future
more heavily and consume earlier in life than they would otherwise. Social secu-
rity, by partially substituting for private annuities, improves an individual’s
consumption allocation and reduces accidental bequests.
Results indicate that the welfare gains of pay-as-you-go social security, in the
form of insurance provision for uncertain longevity, are outweighed by the cost, in
the form of a lower capital stock.20 Table 7 shows that, in an economy without
annuities, the proportional increase in full lifetime resources required to make an
individual indifferent between the benchmark economy and one where social
security is absent equals 2.36 percent of output, 0.16 percentage points less than
when annuities are present.21 In the absence of annuities, the gains of social secu-
rity, in the form of insurance provision, increase with an individual’s life
expectancy. Therefore, cohorts with higher life expectancy (females, whites, and
college graduates) gain relatively less from privatizing (eliminating) social secu-
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20While recent work by Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995) and Valdivia (1997) show
that under certain conditions the gains of social security can outstrip the costs, their economies differ
in some very important dimensions to that of this paper. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995)
assume that individuals also face uninsured unemployment risk. The introduction of an additional
source of uninsured risk increases the precautionary motives for saving, and increases the gains of
introducing social security by reducing the size of unintended bequests.  Valdivia (1997) assumes that
bequests are operational and that preferences are of constant relative risk aversion. In this framework
the costs of living longer than expected are greater, partly because precautionary motives are absent and
partly because reduced bequests affect the welfare of future generations. In addition, both papers
restrict individual labor supply decisions and hence underestimate the potential distortionary effects of
a wage-tax financed social security system. Finally, the comparison of welfare results across these
models is complicated because, unlike in this paper, different employment and mortality histories trans-
late into intra-age wealth heterogeneity. Further research and sensitivity analysis on the subject is
warranted, yet outside the scope of this paper.
21In the absence of annuities, the equilibrium tax rate and the expected difference between the return
to private capital and that of social security are lower, resulting in lower capital accumulation and labor
supply distortions.
22The long-run welfare gains of eliminating social security are on average 52.2 percent greater for
males than females, 0.8 percent greater for nonwhites than whites, and 6.3 percent greater for college than
noncollege graduates.IV. Conclusion
This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the intragenerational redistributive
elements of the U.S. social security system in the context of a general equilibrium
model. Differences in life expectancy and labor productivity translate into differ-
ences in capital accumulation and labor supply distortions, which are in turn
responsible for differences in the welfare of individuals that differ by gender, race,
and education. Results suggest that the current old-age insurance scheme is life-
time progressive across gender and education, yet lifetime regressive across race.
Therefore, the privatization of social security is likely to benefit on average more
males and college graduates than females, and noncollege graduates, respectively.
This paper has important shortcomings, however. It studies the lifecycle
behavior of single men and women, and treats social security purely as an old-age
insurance program. How then do we reconcile the finding that social security
benefits females at the expense of males when in reality men and women, as
husbands and wives, make joint economic decisions? In addition, social security
not only provides retirement insurance, but it also plays an important role in the
provision of life insurance to dependent spouses and survivors.23
A natural extension of this paper would be to reevaluate the intracohort redis-
tribution of social security (including spouse and survivor insurance) at the house-
hold level rather than at the individual level. In the proposed framework, a
household would be characterized not only by the age and gender of the head and
corresponding spouse (if married), but also by its marital status and number of
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis: Social Security and Economic Aggregates
No Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Policy τ (%) K/Y K N C Y Ω/ PV LE Ω/ Y
Benchmark 9.33 3.351 1.838 0.278 0.403 0.549 0.00 0.00
η = 0% 0.00 3.854 2.330 0.285 0.431 0.608 2.36 2.44
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 3, θ = 0.33
Policy τ (%) K/Y K N C Y Ω/ PV LE Ω/ Y
Benchmark 10.04 3.813 2.393 0.296 0.445 0.628 0.00 0.00
η = 0% 0.00 4.248 2.903 0.303 0.462 0.683 1.99 2.27
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 0.980, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Policy τ (%) K/Y K N C Y Ω/ PV LE Ω/ Y
Benchmark 8.09 2.631 1.207 0.266 0.367 0.459 0.00 0.00
η = 0% 0.00 2.825 1.391 0.275 0.386 0.492 3.20 2.20
Note: Benchmark policy: η = 40%, IR = 65, and progressive benefit formula.
23One-quarter of all Old Age and Survivor Insurance (OASI) payments goes to survivors. dependents.24 Survival benefits are likely to be greater for groups with higher
fertility rates, and higher probabilities of death of a household head. In addition,
transfers to dependent spouses will differ according to the degree of household
specialization, determined by the relative productivity (education) differences of
the spouses. Finally, adding marital status to the model allows us to address life
insurance ownership questions, and the extent to which it is affected by public
provision.
Integrating spouse and survivor insurance in a modeling context where men
and women make joint economic decisions and face changes in their marital status
is likely to open a realm of unexplored policy issues. 
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24Cubeddu and Ríos-Rull (1997), in a similar framework, study how changes in the patterns of house-
hold formation and dissolution affect saving decisions at the household and aggregate level.
Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis: Intracohort Welfare and Social Security (Part A)
(percent change)
No Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours 
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
Male 31.40 0.97 1.94 2.95
Female 23.47 3.32 3.72 1.93
White 26.87 2.10 2.67 2.43
Nonwhite 27.07 2.11 2.56 2.45
College 23.92 2.16 2.75 2.56
Noncollege 28.38 2.09 2.59 2.40
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 3, θ = 0.33
Hours 
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
Male 20.04 1.05 1.95 2.70
Female 22.27 2.92 3.21 1.29
White 21.67 1.89 2.41 1.96
Nonwhite 19.63 2.27 2.67 2.12
College 18.78 1.74 2.34 2.21
Noncollege 22.46 2.05 2.52 1.92
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 0.980, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours 
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
Male 14.39 1.81 2.51 3.56
Female 15.68 3.57 3.86 2.83
White 15.67 2.55 2.96 3.20
Nonwhite 13.28 2.96 3.34 3.18
College 12.72 2.49 2.95 3.30
Noncollege 16.31 2.69 3.08 3.16Appendix I. Computation of Equilibrium
The solution methodology, the Gauss-Seidel method, is borrowed from Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987). It involves solving a complicated set of nonlinear equations that specify households’
and firms’ optimization behavior and the government’s budget constraint. The algorithm starts
with guesses for the capital to labor ratio, the age-specific shadow wages, and the social secu-
rity tax rate. When the social security benefit formula is progressive it also requires a guess for
the economy’s average labor earnings. The capital to labor guess determines the relative factor
prices that when combined with the shadow wage, social security tax rate, and benefit formula
solve for the optimal behavior of individuals. The standard procedure in lifecycle models is to
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Table 9. Sensitivity Analysis: Intracohort Welfare and Social Security (Part B)
(percent change)
No Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
College 33.13 1.09 2.04 2.84
Male White Noncollege 27.92 0.42 1.78 3.32
College 32.86 1.13 1.83 2.84
Nonwhite Noncollege 26.40 1.16 2.05 3.02
College 24.29 3.16 3.54 1.14
Female White Noncollege 21.29 3.99 4.28 1.80
College 25.51 3.10 3.30 1.99
Nonwhite Noncollege 22.33 3.35 3.76 2.04
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 1.011, γ = 3, θ = 0.33
Hours
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
College 22.08 1.12 2.03 2.56
Male White Noncollege 17.50 0.27 1.57 3.06
College 18.98 1.64 2.32 2.68
Nonwhite Noncollege 14.73 1.28 2.16 2.95
College 23.60 2.83 3.14 1.21
Female White Noncollege 20.45 3.10 3.34 1.30
College 22.53 3.09 3.26 1.41
Nonwhite Noncollege 19.30 2.78 3.14 1.70
Perfect Annuity Markets: β = 0.980, γ = 4, θ = 0.33
Hours
Population Savings Hours Quality Adjusted ω j
College 16.76 1.82 2.55 3.52
Male White Noncollege 11.46 1.16 2.14 3.82
College 12.73 2.39 2.96 3.44
Nonwhite Noncollege 8.14 2.21 2.93 3.54
College 16.84 3.46 3.77 2.81
Female White Noncollege 14.15 3.77 4.02 2.82
College 15.85 3.68 3.86 2.86
Nonwhite Noncollege 13.00 3.56 3.90 2.95go to the last period of an individual’s life, where the future is no longer relevant, and solve for
the behavior of the individual. In turn, this behavior would describe the nature of the future for
individuals of the previous age. The recursive nature of the problem allows for the determina-
tion of the behavior for individuals of all ages.
From the derived labor supply decisions, new guesses for shadow wages are obtained.
Aggregation of labor supply and saving decisions across all population subgroups in turn
provide a new guess for the capital to labor ratio. From the labor supply decisions the earnings
of each type of individual are determined, as well as the new social security tax guess that
follows from the government’s budget constraint. Typically, 10 to 20 iterations are required to
achieve convergence to a steady-state equilibrium. The introduction of heterogeneity in
age–cohort labor productivity and mortality risk only adds to the size and dimension of the
problem in hand, but fundamentally does not alter the solution algorithm.
The computational algorithm for the no-annuity-case differs only slightly. Besides providing
starting guesses for the capital to labor ratio, the age-specific shadow wages, the social security tax
rate, and the economy’s average labor earnings, a guess for the lump-sum transfer of accidental
bequests must also be specified. In this case, the aggregation of labor supply and saving decisions
provide new guesses for the capital to labor ratio and the lump-sum transfer of accidental bequests.
Appendix II. The Welfare Function
Welfare for type j individuals, who face a social security policy x ˆ, is defined as the expected
discounted lifetime utility they derive from optimal consumption and leisure contingency plans: 
(15)
The benchmark economy approximates the current social security program, where the average
replacement rate to income is 40 percent, legal retirement age is 65, and the benefit formula is
progressive. The welfare loss or gain for an individual of type j of departing from the benchmark
economy is defined as the proportional increase or decrease in full lifetime resources required to
make an individual of type j indifferent between the benchmark economy and an alternative
economy. Because the utility function is homothetic, a change in an individual’s lifetime wealth,
provided factor prices are fixed, is associated with a proportional change in an individual’s life-
time consumption and leisure. Therefore, the resources required to make an individual of type j,
indifferent between the benchmark economy x ˆ and the alternative economy x* equal:
(16)
The product of ω j(x*) and the expected present value of labor endowment in the benchmark
economy represents the additional resources necessary to make individuals of type j indifferent
between the benchmark and alternative economy. Social security is considered “lifetime progres-
sive” if resources required to make individuals indifferent between the benchmark economy and an
alternative economy without social security increase with the present expected value of their labor
endowment in the benchmark economy. The aim of this exercise is not to make pareto-like state-
ments, but rather statements of the sort: “an individual is better or worse off in an economy with
social security policy x*, than if he or she were to live in an economy with social security policy x ˆ.” 
To compare the overall welfare gains or losses associated with alternative social security
arrangements, a social welfare function is defined where the lifetime resources of each type of
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benchmark economy x ˆ, and the alternative economy x*, is given by 
(17)
Tables 3 and 7 in the main text show Ω (x*) expressed as both relative to output and relative to
the present value of lifetime resources.
Appendix III. Sensitivity Analysis
This section examines the robustness of the policy experiments. In particular, it determines the
extent to which results change with values for the risk aversion coefficient, γ , and the subjec-
tive discount factor, β .
Changes in the Degree of Risk Aversion
A fall in the risk aversion parameter γ is equivalent to an increase in the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and hence an increase in the desire to postpone consumption. The model
confirms that lowering the risk aversion parameter, from γ= 4 to γ= 3, will increase the capital
to output ratio in the benchmark economy by 12 percent. 
Results indicate that capital accumulation is less responsive to changes in social security the
lower the degree of risk aversion. Eliminating social security will cause aggregate capital to fall by
21.3 percent when γ= 3, yet by 22.8 percent when γ= 4. The degree of risk aversion will affect
capital accumulation distortions in two ways. First, the inefficiency associated with intertemporal
distortions increases with the degree of risk aversion. In addition, since capital accumulation falls
with the degree of risk aversion, the difference between the steady-state return to capital and the
return to social security increases. These facts imply that the welfare gain of eliminating social
security increases with the value of the risk aversion parameter. See Table 7.
Finally, a reduction in the risk aversion parameter will also increase the intracohort differ-
ence in well-being. The welfare gains of eliminating social security are now 52.3 percent
greater for males than females, 7.6 percent greater for nonwhites than whites, and 13.6 percent
greater for college than noncollege educated. For more details, see Tables 8 and 9.
Changes in the Discount Factor
In overlapping generations economies, the market rate of discount exceeds the rate at which
individuals discount the future. Therefore, the lower the discount factor, the weaker are the
incentives to postpone consumption and consequently the lower the economy’s stock of capital.
As predicted, lowering the discount factor from β = 1.011 to β = 0.98 will reduce the capital to
output ratio in the benchmark economy by 30 percent, from 3.40 to 2.63. 
In addition, reducing the discount factor will cause capital accumulation to be less respon-
sive to changes in social security policy. Eliminating social security will increase aggregate
capital by 22.8 percent and 15.2 percent, for β = 1.011 and β = 0.98, respectively. Yet, the
welfare gain associated with social security, as a percentage of the present value of lifetime
























25For smaller discount factors, the increase in full lifetime resources required to make all individuals
indifferent between the benchmark economy and one where social security is absent is larger relative to
the economy’s present value of labor endowment.discount factor reduces saving incentives and hence saving distortions, on the other hand, it
increases saving and labor supply distortion, by increasing the difference between the steady-
state return to capital and the return to social security. Simulation results indicate the latter
effect dominates the former (see Table 7). 
Regarding the magnitude of intragenerational redistribution, results indicate that increases
in the rate of time preference will reduce the welfare difference between our lifetime cohorts.
The welfare gains of eliminating social security are 20.5 percent and 4.2 percent greater for
males and college educated, respectively. However, in contrast to the baseline result, whites
stand to gain slightly more from reductions in social security than nonwhites. While whites
observe on average higher returns to social security contributions, they also observe on average
later labor productivity peaks. As the desire to postpone consumption lessens, the positive effect
of observing higher returns is outweighed by the negative effect of having later productivity
peaks. Hence, whether social security is lifetime regressive or progressive across race is very
sensitive to changes in the discount factor (see Tables 8 and 9).
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